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Abstract
Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose an Egalitarian Simultaneous Reserva-
tionrule (ESR), a generalization of Serial rule, one of the most discussed
mechanisms in random assignment problem, to the more general random
social choice domain. We provide an alternative denition, or characteri-
zation, of ESR as the unique most ordinally-egalitarian one.
Specically, given a lottery p over alternatives, for each agent i we con-
sider the total probability share in p of objects from her rst k indi¤erence
classes. ESR is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the
vector of all such shares (calculated for all i, k).
Serial rule is known to be characterized by the same property (see [2]).
Thus, we provide an alternative way to show that ESR, indeed, coincides
with Serial rule on the assignment domain. Moreover, since both rules
are dened as the unique most ordinally-egalitarian ones, our result shows
that ESR is the right wayto think about generalizing Serial rule.
Keywords: Random Social choice, Random assignment, Serial Rule,
Leximin
1 Introduction
We consider the classical votingproblem, when n agents have to jointly choose
one common alternative from a given set A = fa1; :::; awg. Or goal is to inves-
tigate plausible systematic preference aggregating mechanisms (rules) for this
problem, which do not use monetary transfers.
When preferences overA di¤er substantially, it might be di¢ cult to choose an
alternative agents would consider a good compromise. One way to overcome this
problem is to allow for an outcome to be a lottery over A, or a vector of shares
of alternatives, rather then a unique alternative. Potentially, any probability
distribution p = (p1; :::; pn) 2 A can be jointly chosen as an outcome. We may
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interpret p as a real lottery to be performed. Hence, the nal ex-post outcome
still would be a single pure alternative. However, agents might regard the
process (if not the outcome) as more fair. Alternatively, p may be interpreted
as a vector of time-shares, fractions of total time each alternative is in place.
Which interpretation is more appropriate, depends on the particular economic
situation. We abstract from it and concentrate on the formal model, which
encompasses both.
A prominent paper by Gibbard [9] on this random social choice model re-
stricts attention to the ordinal mechanisms. Agents are assumed to have
strict preferences over A, and are only asked about their orderings of pure al-
ternatives. It is implicitly assumed though, that they have cardinal utilities
over the alternatives, and compare lotteries based on the expected utility. This
assumption gives rise to a strong requirement of strategy-proofness: a rule is
non-manipulable only if an agent can never gain (no matter what are her cardi-
nal utilities behind) by altering her ordinal input. Gibbard [9] characterizes all
strategy-proof mechanisms. Follow-up works were also mainly concerned with
non-manipulability.
When we allow for indi¤erences in agentspreferences, assignment of pri-
vate goods becomes a particular case of voting model (each agent is indi¤erent
between all assignments which give her the same thing). Ordinal random as-
signment model, with indivisible goods and no monetary transfers, became a
very active area of research in recent 10-15 years. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3]
proposed to look at the ordinal random assignment mechanisms (agents are only
required to report preferences over deterministic alternatives). They introduced,
for the strict preference domain, a new Serial rule, which is computed allow-
ing agents to acquire (eat) shares of objects simultaneously with the same
constant speed, in decreasing order of their preferences. While it only satises
a week version of non-manipulability, its fairness and e¢ ciency properties are
very strong. In particular, it is not only anonymous, but also envy-free. Serial
rule became one of the most studied ordinal mechanisms (another one is Ran-
dom Priority). Several generalizations were proposed. Bogomolnaia, Moulin
[4] introduced Egalitarian rule for the dichotomous assignment domain. Katta,
Sethuraman [10] extended the denition of Serial rule to the full domain (in-
di¤erences are allowed), which is also an extension of the above Egalitarian
rule from the dichotomous domain. Several recent papers (see, for example [6],
[7], and, for the full domain, [8]) provided axiomatic characterizations of Serial
rule, mostly by means of e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and some type of monotonic-
ity with respect to certain changes in preferences. Bogomolnaia [2] proposes an
alternative denition, or a characterization, of Serial rule, both for strict and
full domain. Given an arbitrary random assignment, one can calculate, for each
agent i, her total probability share of goods from her k best indi¤erence classes.
Serial rule happens to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector
of all such shares (calculated for all i, k). Thus, arguably, Serial rule emerges
as the (unique) most egalitarian random rule, when social planner is restricted
to ordinal information only. This result also serves as a justication of the ex-
tension of Serial rule to the full domain, proposed in [10]. It shows that this
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generalization is indeed in the same spirit as Serial (or Egalitarian) rule, aiming
at the ordinally-egalitarian goal.
Returning to the random voting problem, now over full domain (indi¤erences
allowed), Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose a random social choice (voting) rule
which they call Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR). This rule is based
on the same simultaneous eating ideas as Serial rule. Indeed, ESR is intro-
duced as a joint generalization of two rules. One is Serial rule, introduced in
[3], [4], and [10] for strict, dichotomous, and full private goods domain, and an-
other is Egalitarian random voting rule, dened in [5] on the dichotomous voting
preference domain. Aziz and Stursberg [1] show that on the assignment domain
ESR coincides with Serial rule and on the dichotomous domain it coincides with
the Egalitarian voting rule. In order to show the equivalence with Serial rule
for assignment domain, they rely on a recent characterization result, [8], which
singles out Serial rule on full domain by ordinal e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and
limited invariance(the proof in [8] is rather long and complicated). Aziz and
Stursberg [1] check that ESR satises those three properties on the assignment
domain. The checks, while not very complicated, are also rather long and non-
intuitive. Note also, that the notion of envy-freeness looses its meaning beyond
the domain of private goodsassignment. While ESR remains ordinally e¢ cient
and satises limited invariance on the full domain, those properties do not sin-
gle it out. This, while ESR is one of possible generalizations of Serial rule, the
question remains whether it is the most appropriate one.
Current work proposes an alternative denition (or a characterization) of
ESR, along the same lines as the alternative denition of Seral rule, proposed
in Bogomolnaia [2]. It shows that, at any preference prole, ESR lottery is
the unique leximin maximizer of the vector of the total shares agent i gets of
the objects from her top k indi¤erence classes, calculated for all i and k. An
immediate corollary, given the result in Bogomolnaia [2], is an alternative, much
more straightforward, way to show that ESR is indeed an extension of Serial
rule to the larger domain.
Our main result can be illustrated by the following interpretation. Fix a
lottery p. Split each agent in as many sub-agentsas the number of indi¤erence
classes in her preferences. Agent is rst sub-agent only cares about her rst
indi¤erent class, her second sub-agent only cares about her two top indi¤erent
classes, etc. Thus, the utility of agent is k-th sub-agent is measured by the
total amount of objects she gets from her rst k indi¤erence classes. Our result
is that ESR rule maximizes the leximin (Rawlsian) collective utility of those
sub-agents. It rst attempts to maximize the utility of the worst-o¤ sub-agent,
then the utility of the second worst-o¤ one, and so on.
Rephrasing, the ESR allocation is the most egalitarian (the Rawlsian max-
imizer) in attempting to equalize agentsshares of top ranked objects (i.e. of
upper counter sets of objects) under di¤erent cuto¤s. Recall that agents only
report rankings of objects, not their relative valuations, so equalizing allocated
shares for di¤erent upper counter sets seems to be the best available instrument
for an egalitarian mechanism designer.
All the above allows us to argue that ESR is indeed the right way to
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generalize Serial rule to the general random voting domain. Both original and
generalized rules have exactly the same nature: each gives the unique most
ordinally-egalitarianway to compromise between agents.
2 Model and Results
Given are a set of agentsN = f1; :::; ng and a set of alternatives A = fa1; :::; awg.
Each agent i 2 N has arbitrary preferences Ri, or i; over A, which are rep-
resented by a partition of A into Ki indi¤erence classes E1i ; :::; E
Ki
i (a i b if
and only if a 2 Eli, b 2 Eri , and l < r). Denote by R the set of all preference
orderings over A.
Let (A) be the set of all lotteries on A. A random social choice rule is a
correspondence f : Rn  (A), which is essentially single-valued. Specically,
at any preference prole R = (R1; :::; Rn), f(R)  (A), f(R) 6= ?, and all
agents are indi¤erent between all outcomes in f(R).
Fix a preference prole R, once and forever. Let Ei =
n
E1i ; :::; E
Ki
i
o
be the
set of agents i indi¤erence classes, and let E = S Ei (the union of all indi¤erence
classes over all agents).
Given an arbitrary lottery p = (p1; :::; pw) 2 (A), where pj = p(aj),
we will write p(E) =
P
a2E
p(a). For any agent i and any k  Ki, we de-
ne ti(k) = t
p
i (k) =
P
rk
p(Eri ) =
P
aj2[rkEri
pj , the total share agent i gets
in the lottery p of objects from her rst k indi¤erence classes. Dene vector
ti = t
p
i = (ti(1); :::; ti(Ki)), where Ki is the number of indi¤erence classes in Ri.
We could think of each agent i as being represented by Ki sub-agentswith
dichotomous preferences, following Ri, but with di¤erent thresholds. This way,
ti(k) is the total utility of the k-th sub-agentof agent i.
As we will see, ESR rule dened below aims at equalizing the utilities ti(k)
of all
P
i2N
Ki sub-agents, thus maximizing their collective welfare in Rawlsian
sense.
Example1 (N = 5; A = fa; b; c; d; eg) Consider the following preference prole:
1 : fag 1 fbg 1 feg 1 fc; dg; 2 : fag 2 fcg 2 fdg 2 fb; eg;
3 : fb; dg 3 fa; c; eg; 4 : fc; eg 4 fa; b; dg; 5 : fcg 5 fa; b; eg 5 fdg.
Here E = ffag; fbg; feg; fc; dg; fcg; fdg; fb; eg; fb; dg; fa; c; eg; fa; b; dg; fa; b; egg.
For the lottery q = ( 16 ; 0;
1
2 ;
1
12 ;
1
4 ) we obtain:
t1 = (
1
6 ;
1
6 ;
5
12 ; 1), t2 = (
1
6 ;
2
3 ;
3
4 ; 1), t3 = (
1
12 ; 1), t4 = (
3
4 ; 1), t5 = (
1
2 ;
11
12 ; 1).
For the lottery p = ( 13 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ; 0; 0), we obtain:
t1 = (
1
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ; 1), t2 = (
1
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ; 1), t3 = (
1
3 ; 1), t4 = (
1
3 ; 1), t5 = (
1
3 ;
2
3 ; 1).
Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose a random social choice rule which they call
Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR).
1Borrowed from [1]; this example will be used throughout the paper for illustration purposes
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ESR starts from the set of all feasible lotteries, and then repeatedly shrinks
this set over time interval [0; 1]. This is done by sequentially introducing (the
largest feasible) lower bounds on probabilities of certain indi¤erence classes from
E in the nal lottery. At each step, ESR only cares to guarantee each agent
the largest share of objects from her top indi¤erence class still available for
distributing. As we will see, ESR pursues an egalitarian goal to guarantee the
best treatment for the worst o¤ agents. Aziz and Stursbergs denition is given
by the following algorithm.
Each indi¤erence class E = Eri is represented by a tower growing over
time, with the ceiling lt(E) 2 R+ at time t. This ceiling represents the
minimal guarantee for the probability the subset E of alternatives is to receive
in the nal lottery. During the course of the algorithm, agents climb up those
towers (all with the same constant speed) and in doing that push up the ceilings,
therefore increasing the lower bounds on probabilities of corresponding subsets.
All towers have ceilings zero at time  = 0. Algorithm proceeds in stages.
In stage 1, each agent starts by climbing the tower corresponding to her top
indi¤erence class. A towers height is frozen, if increasing it would result in
nonexistence of a lottery satisfying all lower bounds for all towers. Once a
tower is frozen, any agent at its ceiling falls o¤ it, and moves to the bottom of
the tower corresponding to her next indi¤erence class2 . Any agent in the middle
of a frozen tower will continue to climb it until the frozen ceiling. Then she will
fall o¤ and move to her next best tower. A stage ends whenever some agent
falls o¤ some ceiling.
Notation. Let l(k) : E !R+ be the height of the ceiling in the tower S 2 E
at the end of stage k. Function E(k) : N ! E represents the towers each agent
i climbs during stage k. Let h(k)i be the height where agent i is in her tower at
the beginning of stage k; (k) be the duration of stage k; N (k)  N be the set
of agents falling o¤ at the end of stage k;  (k) be the total time passed at the
beginning of stage k.
Assign l(0)(S) = h(0)i = 
(0) = 0, and E(0)(i) = E1i (the top indi¤erence
class of agent i), for all i 2 N and all S 2 E .
Stage k. Compute (k) and N (k) (see the linear program below the algo-
rithms description), as well as towers to be frozen. Let  (k+1) =  (k) + (k),
and agentsheights for the beginning of the next stage be h(k+1)i = h
(k)
i + 
(k)
if i =2 N (k), h(k+1)i = 0 if i 2 N (k) (i.e., if agent i fell o¤). For any S 2 E dene
l(k+1)(S) = max
n
l(k)(S);max
n
h
(k+1)
i jE(k)(i) = S
oo
(new ceilings, dened as
maximum of the old ceiling and maximal of agentsheights over those who were
climbing this tower during stage k). For all agents who fell o¤, i 2 N (k), dene
E(k+1)(i) to be the agents i next indi¤erence class. For remaining agents, dene
E(k+1)(i) = E(k)(i).
Calculation of (k) and N (k) comes from solving the following Linear Pro-
gram.
First, we nd (k) by solving max subject to:
2 It might be an already frozen tower!
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P
a2S
p(a)  l(k)(S) for all S 2 E ; P
a2E(k)(i)
p(a)  h(k)i +  for all i 2 N ;P
a2N
p(a)  1, p(a)  0 for all a 2 A;   0.
Then, for all i 2 N we run this program again, imposing  = (k), and max-
imizing the slack in the inequality
P
a2E(k)(i)
p(a)  h(k)i + ; whenever objective
function value is zero, we add corresponding i to N (k).
Thus, resulting N (k) is the largest (by inclusion) set of agents who create the
bottleneck(prevent increasing (k)). I.e., (k) and N (k) are computed as the
largest ones so that there still exists a lottery p 2 (A) with p(S) = P
a2S
p(a) 
l(k+1)(S) for all S 2 E .
Freeze (forever) ceilings of all towers which were climbed by at least one
agent from N (k).
Algorithm nishes when all towers are frozen. Once it is nished, ESR at the
prole R is the set of remaininglotteries p; satisfying inequalities
P
a2S
p(a) 
l(k)(S) for the last step k (and hence for all steps). It is straightforward to
show (see [1]) that for any prole R this set is essentially single-valued. Hence,
ESR is indeed a random social choice rule. Moreover, it is easy to see that for
any prole R, p 2 ESR(R) and (q utility equivalent to p) imply q 2 ESR(R).
Thus, ESR(R) includes all lotteries utility equivalent to any one obtained by
the algorithm above.
Example (continuation) We consider the following preference prole:
1 : fag 1 fbg 1 feg 1 fc; dg; 2 : fag 2 fcg 2 fdg 2 fb; eg;
3 : fb; dg 3 fa; c; eg; 4 : fc; eg 4 fa; b; dg; 5 : fcg 5 fa; b; eg 5 fdg.
First, agents 1, 2 climb tower fag, agent 3 climbs tower fb; dg, agent 4 climbs
tower fc; eg, and agent 5 climbs tower fcg. At time 13 ; the rst bottleneck is
reached, all agents fall from their respective ceilings, and move to their 2-nd best
indi¤erence classes. All the above towers are frozen at the height 13 . At this
time, the lower bounds on di¤erent subsets of alternatives (the current ceilings of
corresponding towers) are l(1)(fag) = l(1)(fcg) = l(1)(fb; dg) = l(1)(fc; eg) = 13 .
At time 23 ; the second bottleneck is reached, and the new lower bounds are
l(2)(fbg) = l(2)(fa; c; eg) = l(2)(fa; b; dg) = l(2)(fa; b; eg) = 13 . Note that during
this stage agent 2 is climbing the existing length of tower fcg (from the bottom
till its frozen ceiling 13 ), so she does not push up any ceiling.
Those bounds already uniquely dene the ESR lottery to be p = ( 13 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ; 0; 0).
Denition The leximin order L on Rq is dened as follows. For any x =
(x1; :::; xq) 2 Rq, let x = (x1; :::; xq) 2 Rq be a permutation of the coordinates
of vector x in the increasing order: x1  :::  xq . We say that xLy if there is
a j 2 f1; :::; qg such that xj > yj , while xi = yi for all i < j.
Example (continuation)
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For the lottery q = ( 16 ; 0;
1
2 ;
1
12 ;
1
4 ) we obtain:
t(q) =
 
1
6 ;
1
6 ;
5
12 ; 1;
1
6 ;
2
3 ;
3
4 ; 1;
1
12 ; 1;
3
4 ; 1;
1
2 ;
11
12 ; 1

and
t(q) =
 
1
12 ;
1
6 ;
1
6 ;
1
6 ;
5
12 ;
1
2 ;
2
3 ;
3
4 ;
3
4 ;
11
12 ; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1

.
For the lottery p = ( 13 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ; 0; 0), we obtain:
t(p) =
 
1
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ; 1;
1
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ; 1;
1
3 ; 1;
1
3 ; 1;
1
3 ;
2
3 ; 1

and
t(p) =
 
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ;
2
3 ; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1

.
We thus have t(p)L t(q).
Theorem 1
For all preference proles R, ESR(R) is exactly the set of lotteries over (A)
which leximin maximize the vector3 of shares t = (t1; :::; tn).
Note The intuition behind this result is based on the following. An agent never
skips a tower corresponding to some of her indi¤erence class (even if it is
already frozen), and climbs each subsequent tower up to its ceiling. Thus, by
time  , the ESR algorithm guarantees to any agent the combined probability
share  of the upper counter set of the tower she is currently climbing. The
time when an agent falls from a tower S is exactly the share she (and her
corresponding sub-agent) gets of the upper counter of S. Each time we reach a
bottleneck is exactly the moment where we cannot increase shares of all non-
frozen4 sub-agents anymore, and are forced to freezeshares of the set N (k)
of the worst o¤ not yet frozensub-agents.
Proof.
Fix an arbitrary preference prole R. Since they are utility equivalent, all
p 2 ESR(R) result in the the same vector tp and same permutation-vector tp.
Denote the corresponding permutation  : tp ! tp.
Since k < r implies tpi (k)  tpi (r), we can assume that  is such that
 (tpi (k)) <  (t
p
i (r)) for any i, whenever k < r.
In the algorithm, each agent i climbs towers corresponding to her indi¤erence
classes E1i ; :::; E
Ki
i successively in increasing order, and without skipping. She
only falls o¤ a tower and moves to the next one once she reaches a frozen
ceiling. Assume at the end of stage k, at the time  (k+1), agent i falls o¤
tower Emi . It means that by the time 
(k+1) towers corresponding to E1i ; :::; E
m
i
are frozen at their nal heights l
 
E1i

; :::; l (Emi ) which correspond to their
maximal feasible minimal guarantees. I.e., in a nal lottery probabilities of
those indi¤erence classes will be exactly l
 
E1i

; :::; l (Emi ). Since our agent i
goes through each tower from bottom to top and never stops, we obtain that
the total share she gets of objects from her rst m indi¤erence classes tpi (m) =
l
 
E1i

+ :::+ l (Emi ) = 
(k+1).
3Recall that each ti is itself a vector, ti = (ti(1); :::; ti(Ki)), where ti(k) =
P
aj2[rkEri
pj .
Hence, t = (t1; :::; tn) is the vector of length
P
i2N
Ki.
4A sub-agent is frozenwhen the tower corresponding to her lowest in Ri class of accept-
able objects is frozen, and thus her utility is determined.
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Moreover, if instead at the beginning of stage k + 1 agent i is at the height
h
(k+1)
i > 0 in tower E
m
i , then t
p
i (m   1) = l
 
E1i

+ ::: + l
 
Em 1i

=  (k+1)  
h
(k+1)
i .
We will check by induction (in stages of the algorithm), that at each stage k
the algorithm to nd ESR(R) considers, for each agent i, the smallest not yet
xed tpi (mi) (here mi = mi(k), we suppress the stage index), and maximizes
(xes) the smallest of those. More specically, it nds a largest  such that it
is feasible to have min
i2N
tpi (mi)   and xesall tpi (mi) which cannot be larger
than  to be tpi (mi) = . The theorem follows immediately from this statement.
In stage 0, the algorithm starts by eliminating all lotteries, except those
which maximize the smallest among tpi (1) = p(E
1
i ) =
P
a2E1i
p(a), i.e. the smallest
element in tp. In other words, it xes(freezes) all tpi (1) with i 2 N (k), i.e. all
tpi (1) which cannot feasibly be more then 
(1), at the level tpi (1) = 
(1).
In each next stage k + 1, the algorithm pays attention to exactly one tower
Emii for each agent i (the tower E
(k+1)(i) she climbs during this stage), cor-
responding to her mi-th indi¤erence class (mi = mi(k + 1), we suppress the
stage index), while all towers corresponding to agentsbetter indi¤erence classes
are already frozen. Hence, all tpi (m) for all i and all m < mi, are xed to
tpi (m) = l
 
E1i

+ ::: + l (Emi ), their best minimal guarantees (by induction hy-
pothesis).
In stage k + 1 we nd the largest  such that p (Emii ) = p
 
E(k+1)(i)

=P
a2E(k+1)(i)
p(a)  h(k+1)i +  for all i. But h(k+1)i =  (k+1)   tpi (mi   1), so
the constraints can be rewritten as p (Emii )   (k+1)   tpi (mi   1) + , or the
tpi (mi) = p (E
mi
i ) + t
p
i (mi   1)   (k+1) + .
Thus, algorithm nds the largest amount  (k+2) =  (k+1) +(k+1) such that
all tpi (mi) are at least 
(k+2). It then freezes all towers Emii = E
(k+1)(i) whose
height cannot feasibly increase, i.e., xes all tpi (mi) which cannot be larger
then  (k+2) to be tpi (mi) = 
(k+2). 
The same line of argument allows us to prove a parallel characterization.
Let t0i(a) to be the total share of objects at least as good as a agent i gets. The
vector t0 = (t0i(a))i;a has xed length nw, no matter whether preferences are
strict or not.
Theorem 1a
For all preference proles R, ESR(R) is also exactly the set of leximin maxi-
mizers of the t = (t0i(a))i;a.
Serial rule for random assignment problem is known to be characterized by
the same property as in our Theorem 1 (see [2]). We hence obtain:
Corollary
On the assignment domain, ESR coincides with Serial rule.
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